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Abstract. The paper aims at providing a non-linear Game Theory model of coopetition which 
addresses the problem of the global Green Economy. The Green Economy is a theoretical model 
of economic development that suggests economic, technical and legislative solutions to reduce 
the consumption of energy, of natural resources and environmental damage while promoting a 
sustainable development model for the economy. Our coopetitive model is non-linear with 
respect to each strategy of the game. 
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1 Introduction 
 
 
The Green Economy includes those activities and sectors that focus on 
enhancement of “traditional goods" such as: landscape, nature, culture, traditions, food 
and wine. In this paper we apply the notion of coopetition devised by Branderburger 
and Nalebuff (1995). These authors argue that firms operate within a competitive 
environment, but in some cases they realize that the outcome of competition will not be 
a win-lose solution for the players, but it will be a lose-lose result. Thus it is convenient 
for the firm playing the game to change the game and find a win-win solution, that 
indicates a situation in which the firm thinks about both cooperative and competitive 
ways to change the game (ibid., p. 59). The win-win solution is therefore a situation in 
which the firm must cooperate and compete at the same time. 
 
Thus in the present work we apply the notion of coopetition at country level, 
instead of microeconomic firm level. The country has to decide whether it wants to 
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collaborate with the rest of the world in getting an efficient Green Economy, even if the 
country is competing in the global scenario. 
 
Our model will provide different win-win solutions which are going to show 
the convenience for each country to participate actively to a program of sustainability 
and efficient resource allocation within a non-linear coopetitive framework. 
 
The three main variable of our coopetitive model are:  
  x representing the strategy of any country c; 
  y representing the strategy of the rest of the world w; 
  z representing the coopetitive sustainability strategy. 
 
In this paper we suggest an original analytical framework of coopetitive games 
applied at the global environment, with the aim to enrich the set of tools for 
environmental policies. 
 
The paper will show the strategies that could bring to feasible solutions in a 
coopetitive perspective between each country and the rest of the world, by offering win-
win outcomes and to establish a true efficient resource Green Economy at a global level. 
 
 
2 A model of coopetitive games 
 
 
The coopetitive model we propose hereunder must be interpreted as normative models, 
in the sense that it will show win-win strategies within a cooperative perspective. 
 
The main variables of the two models are: 
 
 strategies x of a certain country c (the investment in agricultural and food 
production), which directly influence both pay-off function; 
 
 strategies y of the rest of the word (the investment in agricultural and food 
production) which directly influence both pay-off function; 
 
 a shared strategy z which is determined together by c and the rest of the world 
w: z is the global level of investment for environmental and natural resources.  
Therefore, in the model we assume that c and w define the set C of coopetitive 
strategies. 
 
 
 Main strategic assumptions. 
 
We assume that any real number x, in the unit interval U = [0,1], can be an investment 
of c in agricultural and food production and any real number y, in the same unit 
interval U, can be an analogous investment of w, moreover any real number z, in C = 
[0,6], can be the total investment of c and w for sustainability of natural resources and 
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for the environmental protection. Let assume that the country c and the rest of the world 
w contribute for z with percentages (q, r), in such a way that z = qz + rz. 
 
We also consider as payoff functions of c and w two Cournot type payoff functions. 
 
 Payoff function of c 
 
We assume that the payoff function of c is the function f1 of the set S := U2×C into the 
real line, defined by  
 
 f1(x, y, z) = x (1 - x - y) + z, 
 
for every triple (x, y, z) in the set U2×C . 
 
Payoff function of w 
 
We assume that the payoff function of w is the function f2 of the set S := U2×C into the 
real line, defined by  
 
 f2 (x, y, z) = y (1 - x - y) + (-1/6)(z - 3)2  + 3/2, 
 
for every triple (x, y, z) in the set U2×C. 
 
 
 Payoff function of the game 
 
We so have build up a coopetitive gain game G = (f, >) with payoff function given by  
 
f(x, y, z) = (x (1 - x - y) + z, y (1 - x - y) +(-1/6)(z-3)2+3/2) =  
= (x (1 - x - y), y (1 - x - y)) + (z,(-1/6)(z-3)2+3/2 ), 
 
for every triple (x, y, z) in the set U2×C. 
 
 
3 Study of the game G = (p, >) 
 
Note that, fixed a cooperative strategy z in C, the game G(z) = (p(z), >) with payoff 
function p(z), defined on the square U2 by 
 
 p(z)(x, y) = f(x, y, z), 
 
is the translation of the game G(0) by the vector  
 
v(z)= (z, -(1/6)(z - 3)2 + 3/2 ), 
 
 represented pointwise in the following figure, for every z. 
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so that we can study the game G(0) and then we can translate the information on the 
game G(0) by the vector v(z). 
 
So let us consider the game G(0). The last classic Cournòt game G0 has been studied 
completely by D. Carfì in Topics in Game Theory, Gabbiano 2011. The conservative 
part (the part of interest in the sense of J.P. Aubin) of the payoff space is the canonical 
2-simplex T, convex envelope of the origin and of the canonical basis e of the Euclidean 
plane R2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1 Payoff space and Pareto Boundary of the payoff space of G(z). 
 
The Pareto boundary of the payoff space of G(z) is the segment [e1, e2], with end points 
the two canonical vectors of the plane R2, translated by the vector v(z). 
 
 
5 
 
 
 The payoff space of the coopetitive game G, the image of the payoff function f, 
is the union of the family of payoff spaces 
 
 (im p(z))z , 
 
that is the convex envelope of the of points 0, e1, e2, and of their translations by the 
vector 
 
 v(z) = (z,(-1/6)(z-3)2+3/2 ), 
 
for every z in C. 
 
 The payoff space of the game G is represented below. 
 
 
 
 
3.2 Pareto maximal boundary and the best compromise 
 
 
The Pareto maximal boundary M of the payoff space f(S) of the game G is the union of 
two curves, specifically of the parabolic segment 
 
(0,1) + v([3,6]) 
 
and of the segment [P’, Q’], where the point P’ is the translation e1 + v(6) and Q’ is the 
point e2 + v(6). In the below figure we see the Pareto boundary M and the bargaining 
(Kalai Smorodinsky) solution of the classic bargaining problem 
 
(M,(inf M,sup M). 
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3.3 Properly coopetitive solution 
 
The Nash equilibrium payoff path N is represented below in blue, it is nothing but the 
curve 
 
 N = (1/9,1/9) + v([0,6]), 
 
that is the orbit of the Cournot equilibrium of the game G(0) determined by the curve 
 
v([0,6]). 
 
We see also the properly coopetitive solution: the Kalai Smorodinsky solution of the 
classic bargaining problem 
 
(∂*N,(inf ∂*N,sup ∂*N)), 
 
it is the intersection of the segment [inf ∂*N,sup ∂*N] with the curve ∂*N (Pareto 
maximal boundary of the Nash path), by the way we note that 
 
 ∂*N = (1/9,1/9) + v([3,6]). 
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3.4 Transferable utility coopetitive solution 
 
Below, we show in the figure the transferable utility coopetitive solution (5,2), obtained 
as Kalai Smorodinsky solution of the bargaining problem 
 
 (T, (inf T, sup T)), 
 
where T is the portion [(3,4),(7,0)] of the transferable utility Pareto boundary of the 
game G. Note that a maximum point of the collective gain function g(X,Y) = X + Y 
upon the Pareto boundary M of G is the point (0,7) (or (6,1) or any point in the segment 
[P’,Q’] = [(6,1),(7,0)]). 
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